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According to the two-systems account of theory of mind (ToM), understanding mental
states of others involves both fast social-perceptual processes, as well as slower,
reflexive cognitive operations (Frith and Frith, 2008; Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). To test
the respective roles of specific abilities in either of these processes we administered
15 experimental procedures to a large sample of 343 participants, testing ability in
face recognition and holistic perception, language, and reasoning. ToM was measured
by a set of tasks requiring ability to track and to infer complex emotional and mental
states of others from faces, eyes, spoken language, and prosody. We used structural
equation modeling to test the relative strengths of a social-perceptual (face processing
related) and reflexive-cognitive (language and reasoning related) path in predicting ToM
ability. The two paths accounted for 58% of ToM variance, thus validating a general
two-systems framework. Testing specific predictor paths revealed language and face
recognition as strong and significant predictors of ToM. For reasoning, there were neither
direct nor mediated effects, albeit reasoning was strongly associated with language.
Holistic face perception also failed to show a direct link with ToM ability, while there
was a mediated effect via face recognition. These results highlight the respective roles
of face recognition and language for the social brain, and contribute closer empirical
specification of the general two-systems account.
Keywords: theory of mind, social perception, face recognition, language, individual differences
INTRODUCTION
The ability to make sense of the behavior of others is fundamental for social interaction (Hampton
et al., 2008; Slaughter et al., 2015). How humans deal with this challenging task is, however,
still an unresolved question (Hasson and Frith, 2016). Premack and Woodruff (1978) first
defined strategies for ascribing mental states to others (and to oneself) by the term “Theory of
Mind” (henceforth ToM). Newer findings from research fields such as developmental psychology,
social neuroscience, and research on disorders characterized by social deficits (e.g., autism,
schizophrenia) showed that ToM is a complex construct comprising various processes (Mitchell,
2005; Kennedy and Adolphs, 2012; Schaafsma et al., 2015; Rice et al., 2016). Understanding and
predicting behavior of others certainly involves attribution and/or inferring feelings, intentions,
and beliefs from observable cues conveyed in human action, motion, and facial expression
(Schaafsma et al., 2015).
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Recently, a two-systems framework was propagated, which
distinguishes implicit and explicit processes as the two major
classes of processes involved in ToM (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007;
Frith and Frith, 2008; Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). Socially
relevant information is assumed to be transmitted by different
signal systems, such as vocalization, facial expression, gaze
direction, and body motion. Decoding of such socially relevant
cues unfolds via implicit processes that are automatic, immediate,
and reflex-like. However, humans also have knowledge and
implicit theories on what kind of behavior and which reactions
are expected in social situations – knowledge that is shaped
by individual experience and by culture (Dunn et al., 1991;
Shahaeian et al., 2011). The processes that are involved
in explicit representation of the others’ mental states and
beliefs are thought to be cognitively demanding, reflective
and slow (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007; Frith and Frith, 2008;
Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). While the integrative view on
ToM processes outlined by the two-systems account seems
to be compelling, comprehensive empirical evidence is still
missing.
One potential reason for this is the complexity of involved
implicit and explicit processes. Empirical evidence can only use
single facets of either component and try to link them with ToM
ability, which, again, is a complex construct spanning a wider
range of abilities. In the present study, we adopted an individual
differences approach to prove the relationship between social-
perceptual and cognitive abilities as two basic components from
either of the two systems, and ToM. To capture key aspects
of ToM we operationally defined it as the ability to process
complex and social emotional states from eyes, face, and voice,
including meaning of spoken sentences and prosody cues. The
reading the mind in the eyes test (henceforth, RME; Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001) is one of the most frequently used tests of advanced
ToM in clinical settings with groups with autism, Asperger’s
syndrome, and schizophrenia (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 2001;
Browne et al., 2016; Sato et al., 2017). The widespread use is
not limited to populations with social deficits, but the test is also
sensitive to cultural differences (e.g., Adams et al., 2010) and to
individual differences of healthy individuals (e.g., Vellante et al.,
2013; Preti et al., 2017). In this test, participants are required to
attribute the mental state of a person shown in a photograph
of the eyes region. While in the RME-test the stimuli are static,
recognition of complex emotional mental states from dynamic
faces, and, additionally, based on voice prosody and content of
the spoken sentences is required in the Cambridge Mindreading
(CAM) Face-Voice Battery (Golan et al., 2006). The test has
been shown to discriminate between clinical (Autism, Asperger
syndrome) and non-clinical groups (Golan et al., 2006) and it is
sensitive to developmental changes in ToM (Vetter et al., 2013;
Mahy et al., 2014). Recognition of complex emotional states is
assumed to involve higher-level integration and mindreading, but
also low-level perceptual processes (Mitchell and Phillips, 2015).
Hence, there are good reasons to expect that both cognitive and
perceptual processes are relevant for the ability to infer mental
states in these selected ToM tasks.
As basic components of social-perceptual abilities, face
perception and recognition could also be key proficiencies for
ToM. The human face represents a wealth of social signals
such as identity, gender, age, physical health, emotion, and
intentions (Stein et al., 2014; Jack and Schyns, 2015). The question
whether these different kinds of signals in faces are handled
independently or interact with each other is so far unresolved.
While some models postulate functionally and neurologically
independent systems for processing facial identity, emotions,
and facial speech (Haxby et al., 2000; Harris et al., 2014),
other studies provide evidence that these processes are at least
partly overlapping (Calder and Young, 2005; Fisher et al., 2016).
Moreover, face identification and basic emotion recognition are
both facilitated by holistic face processing mechanisms (Calder
et al., 2000; Calder and Jansen, 2005; Tanaka et al., 2012).
Holistic processing is viewed as an adaptive mechanism that
arises through everyday expertise with faces and allows efficient
and automatic processing of all relevant face information (Richler
and Gauthier, 2014; Meinhardt-Injac et al., 2017). Studies
adopting the individual differences approach have identified
holistic processing as a valid predictor of individual differences
in face recognition once the proper measures are chosen
(Richler et al., 2011; DeGutis et al., 2013). Furthermore, face
recognition alongside with fluid cognitive abilities (e.g., figural
reasoning, working memory, immediate and delayed memory)
have been shown to predict individual differences in basic
emotion recognition (Hildebrandt et al., 2015). However, basic
and complex social emotions involve partially different neuronal
pathways (Burnett et al., 2009; Gilead et al., 2016) and recognition
of complex social emotions may be less dependent on holistic
processing than it is the case in basic emotions (Baron-Cohen,
2017). Experimental data supporting this conclusion are so far
missing.
As outlined in the two-systems account (Apperly and
Butterfill, 2009) explicit processes of mindreading are cognitively
demanding, and heavily depend on language and reasoning
ability. Only humans code and decode knowledge about the
(social) world by means of symbolic language systems (Fitch
et al., 2010). From a developmental perspective, language seems
to be a critical aid for ToM development. Knowledge about
the mental states of others and different aspects of language
proficiency (e.g., general language, semantic, syntax) are strongly
related during the course of development across childhood (for
a review see Cutting and Dunn, 1999; Milligan et al., 2007).
A tight relationship between language proficiency and ToM has
been shown to persist in adulthood (Pyers and Senghas, 2009;
Peterson and Miller, 2012). Some authors suggest that language
per se is inextricably linked with representing and understanding
mental and emotional states of others, as it entails the capacity
for representation and reasoning (Barrett et al., 2007; Newton
and de Villiers, 2007; Lupyan and Clark, 2015). While the
relationship between language and ToM is well-established, it
is less clear what the relationship between reasoning and ToM
is. It seems that flexible reasoning in non-social situations and
the ability to employ complex decision rules is a necessary, albeit
not sufficient condition for ToM (Pruett et al., 2015). Although
the results are somewhat inconsistent, there seems to be small,
but significant positive correlation between individual differences
in the RME test and individual differences in higher-reasoning
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 January 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 25
fnhum-12-00025 January 30, 2018 Time: 16:33 # 3
Meinhardt-Injac et al. Two Systems of Theory of Mind
abilities (for a review see, Baker et al., 2014). Moreover, reasoning
and language are tightly interconnected and language is seen
as being supportive of higher-order reasoning (Premack, 2004,
2007; Baldo et al., 2015).
To summarize, abilities of holistic face perception and
recognition, as well as cognitive functions such as language
and higher-order reasoning, either representing facets of the
postulated two systems, could be potential drivers of ToM
ability. In the present study we provide an empirical test of
this theoretical framework, expecting that individual differences
in ToM are predicted by individual differences in holistic face
perception and face recognition as perceptual processed and by
language and reasoning as cognitive processes.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study Outline, Methodological Approach,
and Predictions
Holistic face perception (HP), face recognition (FR), relational
reasoning (RE) and language (LA) are complex abilities, requiring
multiple empirical indicators for their valid representation. We
postulate that ToM is predicted by these four domains of ability,
which means that we have a directed main hypothesis. The
method of choice in this situation is to represent the five abilities
as latent factors, to be derived from multiple indicators, and
to link the factors in directed paths using linear structural
equation modeling (SEM; Bollen, 1989). This approach allows us
to generalize across experimental paradigms and measurement
error of single tests, while it enables testing hypotheses about
directed (causal) effects among latent constructs.
In the framework of SEM, both the adequacy of the
representation of measures by latent factors (“measurement
model”) and the significance and the degree of explained
variance in the to-be-explained (endogeneous) constructs can be
statistically tested and evaluated. It is important to note that these
are independent steps of SEM. Once confirmed the adequacy
of the measurement model by methods of confirmatory factor
analysis, the outcome of the structural modeling depends solely
on the correlation structure among the latent factors. If there are
no substantial correlations, also directed path modeling, which is
a theory-driven proposal for reproducing these correlations, fails.
Based on reasoning outlined in the Introduction, we consider
the following predictions:
[P1] ToM shows significant correlations with HP, FR, RE,
and LA.
Comment. Based on existing evidence (s.a.) we expect
correlations of ToM with abstract reasoning to be
somewhat smaller than with language and/or face
processing related ability.
[P2] ToM is predicted by HP, FR, RE, and LA.
[P3] RE is predicted by LA.
[P4] FR is predicted by HP.
Comment. SEM should prove a significant direct path from
HP to FR if proper measures of HP are used (DeGutis et al.,
2013).
Note that, since P3 and P4 postulate direct paths
HP→FR and LA→RE, indirect causal (mediated) effects of
HP→ToM via FR and LA→ToM via RE are implied by the
set of predictions P2–P4.
At the current state of empirical findings we cannot be more
specific about the relative strengths of the explanatory paths.
A strong link of ToM and language is well-established (s.a.).
Confirmation of this link would thus validate our measurement
models of ToM and LA. Since this is the first attempt to testing
a potential link of face processing abilities to ToM, we cannot be
more specific about its relative strength compared to the link with
LA, albeit we postulate this link theoretically.
Participants
A sample of 343 participants (age between 17 and 40 years;
M = 22.23, SD = 3.38; 71% female) was tested. The
majority of the participants in the sample (290 out of 343)
were between 18 and 25 years of age. More than 92%,
of participants were students of the university of Mainz in
various disciplines, the remainder 8% came from different
professions, mostly from administration and service. Data
collection was conducted in two experimental sessions, each
lasting about 1 h, including breaks. We recruited via university
information material (in e-mails and on flyers) and participants
received monetary compensation for participation. None of
the participants reported impairments in perception, hearing,
or cognitive functions. All subjects reported no serious head
injuries.
Materials and Procedure
In what follows, the tasks used to measure the different abilities
are described. Each task contributed one or two aggregate scores
(indicators), which we used to derive the respective latent factors.
To facilitate readability, alphanumeric codes identify indicators
throughout the text as well as in Table 1 and Figure 1.
We used three indicators of face recognition ability to estimate
a face recognition factor (F1, F2, and F3). Two stem from the
Cambridge Face Recognition Test and one from the Glasgow
Face Matching Test. Face perception ability was measured by
three indicators of holistic face perception (H1, H2, and H3).
The latent factor representing language ability was established
based on three indicators from three tasks measuring vocabulary,
verbal analogies and orthography (L1, L2, and L3). The latent
factor for the reasoning ability was established based on the
indicators gained in the short version of the Raven Test
(R1), and two subtests from IST-2000 (Liepmann et al., 2007),
which tests figural intelligence (R2, dice task) and numerical
intelligence (R3, digit sequence completion task). Indicators
from three tasks (T1, T2, and T3) requiring recognition of
complex mental states from the eyes (Reading the Mind in the
Eyes Test), from videos (Cambridge Mindreading Face Battery)
and from voice (Cambridge Mindreading Voice Battery) were
used to establish a measurement model for ToM. A detailed
description of all indicators, including indicator codes, is given
below.
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics of all measurement variables.
Face recognition M SD M′ SD′ Indicator code
CFMT-upr 0.73 0.14 F1
CFMT-inv 0.57 0.10 F2
GFMT 0.81 0.11 F3
Holistic face perception
Composite Task-CC 0.87 0.09 0.00 0.09 H1
Composite Task-IC 0.72 0.11
Context Congruency Task_CC-upr 0.88 0.12 0.00 0.10 H2
Context Congruency Task_CC-inv 0.77 0.12
Context Congruency Task_IC-upr 0.64 0.14 0.00 0.12 H3
Context Congruency Task_IC-inv 0.59 0.13
Language
Vocabulary-MWTB 0.77 0.10 L1
Verbal Intelligence 0.54 0.13 L2
Orthography 0.40 0.14 L3
Reasoning
Abstract reasoning–Raven Test 0.73 0.13 R1
Figural Intelligence 0.74 0.21 R2
Digit Sequence Completion Task 0.64 0.21 R3
Theory of mind (ToM)
Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) 0.75 0.09 T1
Cambridge Mindreading Face Battery 0.72 0.08 T2
Cambridge Mindreading Voice Battery 0.64 0.09 T3
Sample size was N = 343. The Table shows mean (M), standard deviation (SD) of the original scales, mean and standard deviation of indicator values derived from the
original scales for the holistic face perception measures (M′ and SD′), and indicator code.
H3
H2
H1
Holistic face
perception
F2
F1
F3
Face
recognition
Reasoning
R3
R1
L2
L1
L3
Language
T2T1 T3
Theory
of Mind
.59**
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-.14
.55**
.73**
.20**
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FIGURE 1 | Complete SEM model (measurement and structural model) for predicting ToM by language, reasoning, holistic face perception and face recognition
ability. Empirical indicators are depicted as rectangles and have alphanumeric codes (see section “Materials and Methods”). Latent factors are displayed as ellipses.
Standardized path coefficients are shown with their path arrows. Significant path coefficients are marked by (∗p < 0.05) and (∗∗p < 0.01), and are printed boldface.
Residual variances for all indicators are shown in gray.
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Face Recognition (FR)
[F1 and F2] Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT)
The Cambridge Face Memory Test (Duchaine and Nakayama,
2006) was developed to study briefly delayed face identity
recognition, covering generalization across viewpoint and image
distortion. The test comprises six target identities and 46
distractor identities. There are two versions of the test, one with
upright and one with inverted face stimuli, each encompassing
72 trials. The proportion of correct responses in upright and
inverted versions of the test was measured. The CMFT is freely
available from the authors for scientific purposes.
[F3] Glasgow Face Matching Test (GFMT)
The Glasgow Face Matching Test (GFMT) uses photos of same or
different people, taken in similar lighting and pose, but with two
different cameras, which allows for testing identity-to-identity
rather than picture-to-picture matching. Here the short version
of the GFMT, with a test reliability of 0.91 (see Burton et al., 2010)
was used. The test comprised 40 face pairs, 20 showing same and
20 showing different persons.
Holistic Face Perception (HP)
[H1] Composite Paradigm (CC/IC)
We used the complete composite paradigm (Gauthier and
Bukach, 2007). Composite stimuli were created by combining
the top-half of one face with the bottom-half of a second face.
Subjects were asked to decide whether either the upper or the
lower face halves in two successively shown composite face
images were the same or different. In the congruent condition
(CC) the identity relation of attended and unattended face halves
was the same in a pair of presented faces. In the incongruent
condition (IC) identities of the non-attended face halves differed
from the identities of the attended face halves. As indicator
of holistic processing (H1) the residual regression scores were
calculated as the CC performance not accounted for by IC
performance at the level of individual data.
[H2 and H3] Context Congruency Paradigm (CC/IC)
The context congruency paradigm (Meinhardt-Injac et al., 2010)
measures holistic processing of external (hair, ears, shape) and
internal (eyes, eyebrows, mouth, nose) features in a face. Subjects
were asked to decide whether internal features of two successively
presented composite faces were the same or different. Congruent
and incongruent trials were constructed by following the same
logic as in the composite paradigm. Stimuli were presented
randomized in upright and inverted orientation. The indicator
of holistic processing was calculated as the residual performance
in upright orientation that was not accounted for by performance
in inverted orientation, both for congruent (H2) and incongruent
(H3) trials. For more details on using regression to measure
holistic processing, see DeGutis et al. (2013).
Reasoning (RE)
[R1] Raven Test
A short version of Raven’s standard progressive matrices task
(Raven, 2000) was used to measure abstract reasoning. In 40
trials, listed in order of difficulty, participants were asked to
identify the missing element, which completes a given pattern. All
trials had a visual geometric design with a missing piece. Subjects
were asked to choose one out of eight elements to complete the
matrix.
[R2] Figural Intelligence
An adapted version of the IST-2000 dice task (Liepmann et al.,
2007) was used to measure visual thinking abilities. Participants
were asked to pick the only die from the five dice that depicted
all spatial features as seen in the cue die. The other four
dice showed small differences in featural organization, or the
organization of all three sides was modified. Twelve trials were
presented.
[R3] Digit Sequence Completion Task
A short version of the IST-2000R (Liepmann et al., 2007) digit
sequence completion task was conducted to measure logical
thinking abilities. In 40 trials, listed in order of difficulty, a
sequence of seven digits was presented. Participants were asked
to complete the sequence logically and choose the finishing digit
out of the given four digits.
Language (LA)
[L1] Vocabulary Test MWT-B
The MWT-B was used to estimate the treasury of words.
In 37 trials, participants were asked to pick the only real
word from a five-word sequence. The target word was the
only real word in a sequence of artificial distracter words.
Detailed information on test construction can be found in Lehrl
(2005).
[L2] Verbal Intelligence
A short version of the IST-2000R (Liepmann et al., 2007)
analogy task was used. Per trial, three cue words were presented.
The first two words were connected via a particular semantic
relation. The third cue word had no relational word (e.g., “to
breathe: lung = to sweat: ?”). Along with the cue words, five
other words were presented. One of them (the target word)
had a similar relation to the third cue word. The other four
words (e.g., sun, effort, sweat, temperature) were distractors.
Participants were asked to identify the matching word from the
five presented words. The test comprised 40 trials, listed in order
of difficulty.
[L3] Orthography Test
The test measures orthography and grammar knowledge. Two
different kinds of trials were used. In Trial 1, four almost
identical German sentences were presented, with three of them
comprising only petite differences in spelling, punctuation or in
the use of capital or small initial letters (distractors), and one of
them being the only orthographically and grammatically correct
sentence (target sentence). Participants were asked to read every
sentence thoroughly and to find the target sentence. In Trial
2, three of the presented sentences were orthographically and
grammatically correct (distractors) and one sentence included
a mistake. Herein, participants were asked to identify the only
incorrect sentence. Prior to each of the 17 trials the subjects
received the instruction to identify the only correct or the only
incorrect sentence.
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Theory of Mind (ToM)
[T1] Reading the Mind in the Eyes
This test measures the ability to understand complex mental
states from cues contained in the eyes region of a human face
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Grayscale photographs of the eyes
region of different actors, each revealing a complex emotional or
mental state, were presented to participants consecutively. With
each photo, four adjective descriptions of complex emotions
or mental states were presented, one of them matching the
expression shown in the photo. Participants were asked to choose
the adjective matching the expression from the present photo
best. There were 36 trials in total.
[T2 and T3] Cambridge Mindreading (CAM) Face-Voice
Battery
CAM-F and CAM-V are two separate subtests, whereby either
face or voice stimuli are used for recognition of complex
mental and emotional states (Golan et al., 2006). In the CAM-F,
participants were shown 3–5 s videos of actors portraying one out
of 20 complex emotion concepts. There were 50 videos shown in
total. Subjects were asked to decide which of the four presented
adjectives matched the expressed emotion from the video best.
For the CAM-V, participants were asked to put headphones
on. Thereafter, they were presented 50 individual sentences,
spoken in a particular emotional intonation, each representing
one out of the 20 complex emotion concepts also used in
the video task. After subjects listened to a sentence, four
adjective descriptions of emotions were presented, one of them
matching the vocal expression from the voice recording. Again,
subjects were asked to match the emotion from the voice
recording to the adjective that fitted best. Like in the video
task, overall emotion perception from vocalization was the main
outcome, measured as the sum all correctly identified emotion
expressions.
Indicator Scores
Table 1 shows the basic statistics of the indicator scores, which
were proportions of correct responses within the module specific
tasks, except for the indicators of holistic face perception, H1,
H2, and H3. Based on recommendations of DeGutis et al.
(2013), we calculated residuals from regression equations relating
the score of interest (y-variable) to the score in conditions
where holistic processing is expected to be absent, or reduced
(x-variable). Before regression residuals were calculated it was
ascertained that the expected experimental effects existed, thus
verifying the main prerequisite of the regression method.
Analyzing the data of the composite face paradigm showed
a large congruency effect (1 = 0.16, se = 0.006, t = 25.9,
p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.40). For the context congruency
paradigm we also found a large congruency effect (1 = 0.24,
se = 0.005, t = 27.1, p < 0.001, d = 1.46), which was attenuated
when faces were inverted (1 = 0.18, se = 0.008, t = 21.4,
p < 0.001, d = 1.16). The effect of orientation was large in
congruent, but smaller in incongruent condition (congruent:
1 = 0.11, se = 0.006, t = 19.4, p < 0.001, d = 1.06;
incongruent: 1 = 0.05, se = 0.007, t = 7.0, p < 0.001,
d = 0.38).
Analysis Regime
As the first step in SEM the measurement model for the
latent constructs is defined. Consistently for each of the five
constructs we used three indicators, explained by a single latent
factor. Since confirmatory factor analysis pursues to adequately
reproduce the covariance structure among the indicators, but
not necessarily their actual values, adequacy of the measurement
model is assumed if covariance matrix C of observed indicators
and covariance matrix C′ of the indicators predicted by the
measurement model coincide. This is usually tested by evaluating
deviations with aχ2 statistic (Bollen and Long, 1993). Because the
test is rather sensitive to hurt multivariate normality assumption,
additional fit indices are considered to evaluate the model fit (see
Hu and Bentler, 1999). Among various fit indices, we adopted
the commonly used: root-mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA), and comparative fit index (CFI). CFI values of 0.95
or higher indicate excellent model fit, but values below 0.90
indicate weak or lacking fit and lead to the rejection of the model.
RMSEA values in the range of 0.05 to 0.08 indicate acceptable
fit, while higher values indicate unacceptable fit. RMSEA values
below 0.05 are considered as indicating good or very good model
fit (see Hu and Bentler, 1999, for details). Further tests of the
adequacy of the measurement model concern the deviation of
observed correlation matrix R and model correlation matrix
R′ (correlation residuals). Since the structural model comprises
the regression equations for each endogeneous variable, it is
evaluated by testing its path coefficients (standardized regression
coefficients) for significance, and by evaluating the proportion
of explained variance of each equation. We performed SEM
with the Mplus statistical package (Muthén and Muthén, 2010).
Maximum-likelihood parameter estimates were used with no
constraints for path coefficients or correlations. For convenience,
latent variable variances were fixed to 1. In total, 50 parameters
were estimated. With a sample size of N = 343, this amounts to
6.9 subjects per estimated parameter, which is still considered as
a favorable ratio in the SEM literature (Schreiber, 2008).
RESULTS
Adequacy of Measurement Model
The χ2 test for agreement of observed and model covariance
matrix indicated deviation (χ2 = 116.3, df = 83, p < 0.01).
However, comparative fit index (CFI = 0.952) as well as RMSEA
and its confidence interval (RMSEA = 0.034, 90% CI for
RMSEA = [0.018, 0.048]) both indicated good or very good
model fit, respectively. Such results patterns with conflicting
results from the χ2 test and alternative fit indices are frequent
in SEM studies (see, e.g., Hildebrandt et al., 2015). A potential
reason for the significance of the χ2 test could lie in deviations
in the variance structure. We therefore tested whether there were
any significant residual correlations in Re = R–R′, which would
indicate failure to reproduce the indicator correlations by the
measurement model. Reviewing the 105 residual correlations
showed that their maximum value was still not significant
(re = 0.046, t = 0.85, p = 0.397), confirming to us that
the measurement model was apt to reproduce the empirical
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TABLE 2 | Estimated latent factor correlations.
ToM HP FR LA RE
ToM 1.00
HP 0.56 1.00
FR 0.54 0.59 1.00
LA 0.57 0.26 0.16 1.00
RE 0.35 0.19 0.11 0.73 1.00
The critical correlations for a given significance level are r(0.05) = 0.11,
r(0.01) = 0.14, and r(0.001) = 0.18.
correlation structure of the 15 indicators with good accuracy.
Together with the results for the alternative fit indices, testing
results for the measurement model thus indicated that the latent
factors adequately represented the test indicators.
Structural Model
In SEM the path equations are solved by decomposing the
correlations among the latent variables (see Appendix). Table 2
shows the correlations. In agreement with our first prediction
(P1), ToM showed high bivariate correlations of about 0.55 with
HP, FR and LA, while the correlation with RE was lower. The
correlation of HP and FR was in the same order of magnitude,
slightly exceeding the value reported by DeGutis et al. (2013),
who found r = [0.36, 0.46], depending on the test used. The
highest correlation, r = 0.73, was found between LA and RE,
while RE did just modestly correlate with HP and FR.
Our prediction P2 postulated directed paths to ToM in the
structural model (see connected ellipses in Figure 1). Significant
path coefficients are printed boldface. We found two significant
direct paths, LA→ToM and FR→ToM, while the direct paths
from HP and RE failed to reach significance. However, the
multiple correlation for explaining ToM by the four predictors
was R = 0.76, which amounts to 58% of explained variance
(R2 = 0.58, se = 0.102, t = 5.65, p < 0.001). This suggests
potential mediated (indirect) effects for explaining ToM (see
below).
P3 and P4 were confirmed by the significant and strong path
coefficients, which coincided with their bivariate correlations,
since there was only one predictor in their regression equations.
FR was explained by HP with a 35% variance proportion
(R2 = 0.35, se = 0.14, t = 2.5, p< 0.01) and LA explained 53% of
RE variance (R2 = 0.53, se = 0.11, t = 5.0, p< 0.001).
The bivariate correlation of ToM and HP was r (ToM-
HP) = 0.56, but HP received a much lower path coefficient of
0.25 in the direct HP→ToM path. Since this coefficient reflects
the effect of HP on ToM controlled for FR, this indicated a
mediated effect of HP via FR. The maximum-likelihood estimate
of the mediated effect was 0.19, which practically coincided with
the product of the path coefficients. Testing for significance with
Sobel’s test (Sobel, 1982), which is a relatively conservative test
of mediation (Fritz and Mackinnon, 2007) showed marginal
significance (z = 1.82, p < 0.068). Other authors (MacKinnon
et al., 2002) consider mediation to be present if both path
coefficients of the indirect path are significant, which was the case
for the HP→FR→ToM path (see Figure 1).
Things were different in the paths involving LA and RE. In the
direct LA→ToM path the coefficient for LA was 0.55, which was
very close to its correlation with ToM. Since this path coefficient
describes the effect of LA on ToM controlled for RE, this already
indicated that there was no further leeway for a mediated effect
of LA via RE. The path coefficient relating RE to ToM was small
and non-significant, limiting the estimate for the indirect effect
to −0.1. Accordingly, Sobel’s test indicated clear non-significant
results (z =−0.86, p= 0.392).
Taken together, the structural modeling results revealed
different structures in the ToM paths coming from HP and FR on
the one hand and from LA and RE on the other. Albeit statistically
significant, RE had clearly the lowest criterion correlation of all
four ToM predictors. Structural modeling revealed a strong direct
effect of language on ToM, while direct and indirect effects via
reasoning were absent. In the ToM paths coming from HP and
FR, criterion correlations and predictor intercorrelations were
high, and at equal strengths. Structural modeling showed effects
on ToM from both predictors, but emphasized face recognition
over holistic face perception, which exerted only a mediated effect
on ToM via face recognition.
DISCUSSION
The human ability to track and infer mental states of others
(i.e., Theory of Mind) likely involves different perceptual and
cognitive processes (Mitchell, 2005; Schaafsma et al., 2015), as
outlined in the framework of the two-systems account. These
processes fall into implicit processes that are automatic, reflex-
like and efficient, and slow, cognitively demanding and reflective
explicit processes (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007; Frith and Frith,
2008; Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). Implicit processes comprise
decoding of socially relevant information transferred by facial
expression, voice, and body motion. The explicit representation
of the others’ mental states should involve cognitive skills,
such as language and higher-order reasoning. Albeit a long-
standing debate, yet no comprehensive empirical evidence has
been provided in support of or against such a two-systems
account.
In the present study we supplied comprehensive empirical
evidence, gained from a battery of 15 tests administered to a large
sample of 343 participants. Our results confirm the particular
role of language, being an important facet of the slower
reflexive processes, and reveal, for the first time, the strong
contribution of face processing related ability as a relevant
facet of fast and implicit processes, while they failed to show a
particular relevance of reasoning ability. Thus, only perceptual
and cognitive processes directly involved in processing of socially
relevant information proved to predict the ability to infer
complex emotional and mental states of others from observable
cues. These results contribute closer empirical specification of a
general two-stems framework (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007; Frith
and Frith, 2008; Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Schaafsma et al.,
2015) and highlight the respective role of face processing and
language ability for the social brain (Kennedy and Adolphs,
2012).
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Our findings prioritize the role of face recognition over holistic
perception for predicting ToM ability, which suggests a particular
role of face-identity processing. This is supported by a study
of Palermo et al. (2013), who found a substantial correlation of
emotion matching and face recognition ability, measured by the
CFMT. Using a larger sample of 269 subjects, Hildebrandt et al.
(2015) found evidence for a link between face identity processing
and basic emotion recognition, which coexisted with a link to
general cognitive ability. Schweinberger and Soukup (1998) also
found evidence for interdependence of face-identity and facial
expression processing, showing that facial speech was recognized
better when also face identity processing succeeded. These results
indicate that ability to process personal identity and reading
facial and emotional expression are closely related. These results
correspond to findings showing that the ability to make mental
state inferences form faces and social stories could be related to
other processes of person perception, such as perception of body
motion (Phillips et al., 2011; Rice et al., 2016).
Our structural modeling did not confirm a direct link of
holistic face processing ability to ToM measures. While we found
a direct link between holistic perception and face recognition,
in line with previous findings (Richler et al., 2011; DeGutis
et al., 2013), our failure to confirm a direct link between holistic
processing and ToM measures is in contrast to studies indicating
involvement of holistic processing in basic emotion recognition
(Calder et al., 2000; Calder and Jansen, 2005; Tanaka et al., 2012).
However, recognition of complex emotional and mental states
from faces seem to be less dependent on face context than on
the eyes region alone (Baron-Cohen, 2017). This could be a
potential reason for the failure to find a strong direct link between
holistic processing and ToM. Moreover, holistic face processing
is not only a highly experience-dependent ability (Gauthier and
Bukach, 2007), but also a perceptual strategy, that can be adopted
or not, depending on the requirements of the task (Fitousi,
2016). Face recognition ability, on the other hand, is a basic
ability (Wilmer et al., 2010), which cannot be applied or not,
contingently with the situation. Our results may underestimate
the role of holistic processes for face-based ToM. However, an
experimentally oriented approach is necessary to elucidate role
and use of holistic strategies in processing of complex emotional
and mental states from visual cues in faces, as it was required in
two out of three of our ToM tasks.
The strongest predictor of the individual differences in ToM in
our model was language, represented as a latent factor from three
different tasks that measured vocabulary, verbal intelligence, and
orthography and grammar knowledge. The role of language
skills for the development of ToM has been demonstrated in
normally developing children (for a review see Milligan et al.,
2007), but also in children with delayed language development
(Nilsson and López, 2016), as well as in individuals with sensory
deficits (Pyers and Senghas, 2009). In a study with adolescent
and adult deaf learners of Nicaraguan Sign Language, Pyers and
Senghas (2009) have demonstrated that the ability to reason
about false beliefs followed the acquisition of more advanced
language. The relationship between ToM and language has been
found also in healthy adults when mental states are inferred
from stories (Ahmed and Miller, 2011) and in RME Test
(Peterson and Miller, 2012). However, strong predictive power
of language for ToM task in the present study may, at least
partly, reflect focus on verbal response options (Johnston et al.,
2008). Despite limitations of single ToM tasks, language skills
are seen as a necessary condition for ToM to develop (Pyers
and Senghas, 2009) and as inextricably linked with representing
and understanding mental and emotional states of others (Barrett
et al., 2007; Newton and de Villiers, 2007; Lupyan and Clark,
2015). Taken together, previous and present findings suggest that
language and ToM ability are strongly linked, not only across
development, but also in adulthood.
In contrast to the previous findings (see Baker et al., 2014
for a meta-analysis), our results show that reasoning ability
in non-social situations and the use of complex rules do not
account for individual differences in ToM in healthy young
adults. The relationship between ToM and reasoning is, however,
more complex, since cognitive abilities may be considered as a
necessary, but not sufficient prerequisite for ToM (Pruett et al.,
2015). For example, in atypical development, mental disability
below the normal range of intelligence impairs ToM performance
in Down syndrome (Zelazo et al., 1996), but a well-developed
reasoning ability in autistic persons is no sufficient condition
to pass ToM tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). In persons with
Williams syndrome language processing, face recognition and
ToM are functional despite several deficits in general cognitive
abilities (Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995). These findings suggest
that the impact of general cognitive ability on ToM might
be modulated by language. Here, the modest correlation of
reasoning and ToM did not give rise for a mediated effect in this
direction. For further research on healthy individuals it would be
likely more critical to include tests of executive functions rather
than relational reasoning. Alongside with language, executive
functions seem constantly related to development of ToM in
childhood and adolescence (Dumontheil et al., 2010; Devine and
Hughes, 2014; Hughes and Devine, 2015), and seem to remain a
relevant predictor of the ToM ability in adulthood (Apperly et al.,
2009; Ahmed and Miller, 2011).
We also found significant, albeit modest, correlation between
holistic face processing and language. The holistic mechanism
tapped with facial stimuli seems to reflect basic perceptual
processes that are relevant not only when recognizing facial
identity, but also when reading written words. The effect can be
traced back to holistic effects in word processing (Wong et al.,
2011). Indeed, extensive expertise in processing these stimuli
leads to similar brain specialization in the neighboring areas –
fusiform face area for faces (FFA; McGugin et al., 2012) and in
visual word form area for written words (Baker et al., 2007).
Common for faces and words, despite the obvious difference
in appearance, is extensive experience that humans gather with
these kinds of stimuli in everyday life, as well as their crucial role
in human communication and social interactions.
CONCLUSION
Our results show that social-perceptual and cognitive processes
involved in the representation of socially relevant information
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are significant predictors of individual differences in the ability to
track and to infer complex emotional and mental states of others
from observable cues, including faces, eyes, spoken language and
prosody. This in line with conclusions gained in studies on social
cognition in psychiatric and neurological disorders (Karmiloff-
Smith et al., 1995; Kennedy and Adolphs, 2012). Extensive
experience and social relevance may drive specialization in each
of these skills during development, resulting in longstanding
individual differences.
ETHICS STATEMENT
The research reported in this manuscript fully complied with
the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. We informed
in written form about the study aims, methods, sources of
funding, any possible conflicts of interest, and institutional
affiliations of the researchers, and obtained written informed
consent from all participants. They were free to abstain from
participation or to withdraw consent to participate at any time
without consequences. The data were analyzed anonymously.
The local ethics committee of Johannes Gutenberg University
Mainz approved all experimental procedures.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Authors contributed equally to the conceptualization of the
study. BM-I and MP set up the basic design, and conducted
experiments. BM-I, MP, and GM contributed data analysis and
modeling. All authors were involved in writing, preparation of
the manuscript and its final approval. All authors agree to be
accountable for all aspects of the work, ensuring that questions
related to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the work were
investigated and resolved appropriately.
FUNDING
This work was supported by Internal University Research
Funding grant (“Inneruniversitäre Forschungsförderung”) of the
Johannes-Gutenberg University given to BM-I.
REFERENCES
Adams, R. B. Jr., Rule, N. O., Franklin, R. G. Jr., Wang, E., Stevenson, M. T.,
Yoshikawa, S., et al. (2010). Cross-cultural reading the mind in the eyes:
an fMRI investigation. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 22, 97–108. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2009.
21187
Ahmed, F. S., and Miller, L. S. (2011). Executive function mechanisms of theory of
mind. J. Autism. Dev. Disord. 41, 667–678. doi: 10.1007/s10803-010-1087-7
Apperly, I. A., and Butterfill, S. A. (2009). Do humans have two-systems to track
beliefs and belief-like states? Psychol. Rev. 116, 953–970. doi: 10.1037/a0016923
Apperly, I. A., Samson, D., and Humphreys, G. W. (2009). Studies of adults can
inform accounts of theory of mind development. Dev. Psychol. 45, 190–201.
doi: 10.1037/a0014098
Baker, C. A., Peterson, E., Pulos, S., and Kirkland, R. A. (2014). Eyes and IQ: a meta-
analysis of the relationship between intelligence and “Reading the Mind in the
Eyes”. Intelligence 44, 78–92. doi: 10.1016/j.intell.2014.03.001
Baker, C. I., Liu, J., Wald, L. L., Kwong, K. K., Benner, T., and Kanwisher, N.
(2007). Visual word processing and experiential origins of functional selectivity
in human extrastriate cortex. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104, 9087–9092.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.0703300104
Baldo, J. V., Paulraj, S. R., Curran, B. C., and Dronkers, N. F. (2015). Impaired
reasoning and problem-solving in individuals with language impairment due to
aphasia or language delay. Front. Psychol. 6:1523. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01523
Baron-Cohen, S. (2017). The eyes as window to the mind. Am. J. Psychiatry 174,
1–2. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2016.16101188
Baron-Cohen, S., Jolliffe, T., Mortimore, C., and Robertson, M. (1997). Another
advanced test of theory of mind: evidence from very high functioning adults
with autism or Asperger syndrome. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 38, 813–822.
doi: 10.1111/j.1469-7610.1997.tb01599.x
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., and Plumb, I. (2001). The
“Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test revised version: a study with normal
adults, and adults with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. J. Child
Psychol. Psychiatry 42, 241–251. doi: 10.1111/1469-7610.00715
Barrett, L. F., Lindquist, K. A., and Gendron, M. (2007). Language as context for
the perception of emotion. Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 327–332. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.
2007.06.003
Bollen, K. A. (1989). Structural Equations with Latent Variables. New York, NY:
Wiley.
Bollen, K. A., and Long, J. S. (eds) (1993). Testing Structural Equation Models.
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Browne, J., Penn, D. L., Raykov, T., Pinkham, A. E., Kelsven, S., Buck, B.,
et al. (2016). Social cognition in schizophrenia: factor structure of emotion
processing and theory of mind. Psychiatry Res. 242, 150–156. doi: 10.1016/j.
psychres.2016.05.034
Burnett, S., Bird, G., Moll, J., Frith, C., and Blakemore, S. J. (2009). Development
during adolescence of the neural processing of social emotion. J. Cogn. Neurosci.
21, 1736–1750. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2009.21121
Burton, A. M., White, D., and McNeill, A. (2010). The Glasgow face matching test.
Behav. Res. Methods 42, 286–291. doi: 10.3758/BRM.42.1.286
Calder, A. J., and Jansen, J. (2005). Configural coding of facial expressions:
the impact of inversion and photographic negative. Vis. Cogn. 12, 495–518.
doi: 10.1080/13506280444000418
Calder, A. J., and Young, A. W. (2005). Understanding the recognition of facial
identity and facial expression. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 6, 641–651. doi: 10.1038/
nrn1724
Calder, A. J., Young, A. W., Keane, J., and Dean, M. (2000). Configural information
in facial expression perception. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 26,
527–551. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.26.2.527
Cutting, A. L., and Dunn, J. (1999). Theory of mind, emotion understanding,
language, and family background: individual differences and interrelations.
Child Dev. 70, 853–865. doi: 10.1111/1467-8624.00061
DeGutis, J., Wilmer, J., Mercado, R. J., and Cohan, S. (2013). Using regression
to measure holistic face processing reveals a strong link with face recognition
ability. Cognition 126, 87–100. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.09.004
Devine, R. T., and Hughes, C. (2014). Relations between false belief understanding
and executive function in early childhood: a meta-analysis. Child Dev. 85,
1777–1794. doi: 10.1111/cdev.12237
Duchaine, B., and Nakayama, K. (2006). The Cambridge face memory test: results
for neurologically intact individuals and an investigation of its validity using
inverted face stimuli and prosopagnosic participants. Neuropsychologia 44,
576–585. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2005.07.001
Dumontheil, I., Apperly, I. A., and Blakemore, S. J. (2010). Online usage of
theory of mind continues to develop in late adolescence. Dev. Sci. 13, 331–338.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00888.x
Dunn, J., Brown, J., and Beardsall, L. (1991). Family talk about feeling states and
children’s later understanding of others’ emotions. Dev. Psychol. 27, 448–455.
doi: 10.1037/0012-1649.27.3.448
Fisher, K., Towler, J., and Eimer, M. (2016). Facial identity and facial
expression are initially integrated at visual perceptual stages of face processing.
Neuropsychologia 80, 115–125. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.11.011
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 9 January 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 25
fnhum-12-00025 January 30, 2018 Time: 16:33 # 10
Meinhardt-Injac et al. Two Systems of Theory of Mind
Fitch, W. T., Huber, L., and Bugnyar, T. (2010). Social cognition and the
evolution of language: constructing cognitive phylogenies. Neuron 65, 795–814.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2010.03.011
Fitousi, D. (2016). Comparing the role of selective and divided attention in the
composite face effect: insights from Attention Operating Characteristic (AOC)
plots and cross-contingency correlations. Cognition 148, 34–46. doi: 10.1016/j.
cognition.2015.12.012
Frith, C. D., and Frith, U. (2008). Implicit and explicit processes in social cognition.
Neuron 60, 503–510. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2008.10.032
Fritz, M. S., and Mackinnon, D. P. (2007). Required sample size to detect
the mediated effect. Psychol. Sci. 18, 233–239. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.
01882.x
Gauthier, I., and Bukach, C. (2007). Should we reject the expertise hypothesis?
Cognition 103, 322–330. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2006.05.003
Gilead, M., Katzir, M., Eyal, T., and Liberman, N. (2016). Neural correlates of
processing “self-conscious” vs.“basic” emotions. Neuropsychologia 81, 207–218.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.12.009
Golan, O., Baron-Cohen, S., and Hill, J. (2006). The Cambridge mindreading
(CAM) face-voice battery: testing complex emotion recognition in adults
with and without Asperger syndrome. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 36, 169–183.
doi: 10.1007/s10803-005-0057-y
Hampton, A. N., Bossaerts, P., and O’Doherty, J. P. (2008). Neural correlates
of mentalizing-related computations during strategic interactions in humans.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 105, 6741–6746. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0711099105
Harris, R. J., Young, A. W., and Andrews, T. J. (2014). Dynamic stimuli
demonstrate a categorical representation of facial expression in the amygdala.
Neuropsychologia 56, 47–52. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.01.005
Hasson, U., and Frith, C. D. (2016). Mirroring and beyond: coupled dynamics as a
generalized framework for modelling social interactions. Philos. Trans. R. Soc.
B 371:20150366. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2015.0366
Haxby, J. V., Hoffman, E. A., and Gobbini, M. I. (2000). The distributed human
neural system for face perception. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 223–233. doi: 10.1016/
S1364-6613(00)01482-0
Hildebrandt, A., Sommer, W., Schacht, A., and Wilhelm, O. (2015). Perceiving
and remembering emotional facial expressions - A basic facet of emotional
intelligence. Intelligence 50, 52–67. doi: 10.1016/j.intell.2015.02.003
Hu, L. T., and Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance
structure analysis: conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Struct. Equ.
Modeling 6, 1–55. doi: 10.1080/10705519909540118
Hughes, C., and Devine, R. T. (2015). Individual differences in theory of mind from
preschool to adolescence: achievements and directions. Child Dev. Perspect. 9,
149–153. doi: 10.1111/cdep.12124
Jack, R. E., and Schyns, P. G. (2015). The human face as a dynamic tool for social
communication. Curr. Biol. 25, R621–R634. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2015.05.052
Johnston, L., Miles, L., and McKinlay, A. (2008). A critical review of the eyes
test as a measure of social-cognitive impairment. Aust. J. Psychol. 60, 135–141.
doi: 10.1080/00049530701449521
Karmiloff-Smith, A., Klima, E., Bellugi, U., Grant, J., and Baron-Cohen, S.
(1995). Is there a social module? Language, face processing, and theory of
mind in individuals with Williams Syndrome. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 7, 196–208.
doi: 10.1162/jocn.1995.7.2.196
Kennedy, D. P., and Adolphs, R. (2012). The social brain in psychiatric and
neurological disorders. Trends Cogn. Sci. 16, 559–572. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2012.
09.006
Keysers, C., and Gazzola, V. (2007). Integrating simulation and theory of mind:
from self to social cognition. Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 194–196. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.
2007.02.002
Lehrl, S. (2005). MWT-B Mehrfachwahl Wortschatz-Intelligenztest. Balingen:
Spitta-Verlag.
Liepmann, D., Beauducel, A., Brocke, B., and Amthauer, R. (2007). IST 2000-R.
Göttingen: Hogrefe.
Lupyan, G., and Clark, A. (2015). Words and the world predictive coding and the
language-perception-cognition interface. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 24, 279–284.
doi: 10.1177/0963721415570732
MacKinnon, D. P., Lockwood, C. M., Hoffman, J. M., West, S. G., and Sheets, V.
(2002). A comparison of methods to test mediation and other intervening
variable effects. Psychol. Methods 7, 83–103. doi: 10.1037/1082-989X.7.1.83
Mahy, C. E., Vetter, N., Kühn-Popp, N., Löcher, C., Krautschuk, S., and Kliegel, M.
(2014). The influence of inhibitory processes on affective theory of mind in
young and old adults. Aging Neuropsychol. Cogn. 21, 129–145. doi: 10.1080/
13825585.2013.789096
McGugin, R. W., Gatenby, J. C., Gore, J. C., and Gauthier, I. (2012). High-
resolution imaging of expertise reveals reliable object selectivity in the fusiform
face area related to perceptual performance. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 109,
17063–17068. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1116333109
Meinhardt-Injac, B., Boutet, I., Persike, M., Meinhardt, G., and Imhof, M. (2017).
From development to aging: holistic face perception in children, younger and
older adults. Cognition 158, 134–146. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.020
Meinhardt-Injac, B., Persike, M., and Meinhardt, G. (2010). The time course of face
matching by internal and external features: effects of context and inversion. Vis.
Res. 50, 1598–1611. doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2010.05.018
Milligan, K., Astington, J. W., and Dack, L. A. (2007). Language and theory of
mind: meta-analysis of the relation between language ability and false-belief
understanding. Child Dev. 78, 622–646. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01018.x
Mitchell, J. P. (2005). The false dichotomy between simulation and theory-theory:
the argument’s error. Trends Cogn. Sci. 9, 363–364. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2005.
06.010
Mitchell, R. L., and Phillips, L. H. (2015). The overlapping relationship
between emotion perception and theory of mind. Neuropsychologia 70, 1–10.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.02.018
Muthén, L. K., and Muthén, B. O. (2010). Mplus User’s Guide: Statistical Analysis
with Latent Variables: User’ss Guide. Los Angeles, CA: Muthén and Muthén.
Newton, A. M., and de Villiers, J. G. (2007). Thinking while talking adults fail
nonverbal false-belief reasoning. Psychol. Sci. 18, 574–579. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.01942.x
Nilsson, K. K., and López, K. J. (2016). Theory of mind in children with specific
language impairment: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Child Dev. 87,
143–153. doi: 10.1111/cdev.12462
Palermo, R., O’Connor, K. B., Davis, J. M., Irons, J., and McKone, E. (2013).
New tests to measure individual differences in matching and labelling facial
expressions of emotion, and their association with ability to recognise vocal
emotions and facial identity. PLOS ONE 8:e68126. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.
0068126
Peterson, E., and Miller, S. F. (2012). The eyes test as a measure of individual
differences: how much of the variance reflects verbal IQ? Front. Psychol. 3:220.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00220
Phillips, L. H., Bull, R., Allen, R., Insch, P., Burr, K., and Ogg, W. (2011). Lifespan
aging and belief reasoning: influences of executive function and social cue
decoding. Cognition 120, 236–247. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.05.003
Premack, D. (2004). Is language the key to human intelligence? Science 303,
318–320. doi: 10.1126/science.1093993
Premack, D. (2007). Human and animal cognition: continuity and discontinuity.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104, 13861–13867. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0706147104
Premack, D., and Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of
mind? Behav. Brain Sci. 1, 515–526. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00076512
Preti, A., Vellante, M., and Petretto, D. R. (2017). The psychometric properties
of the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test: an item response theory (IRT)
analysis. Cogn. Neuropsychiatry 22, 233–253. doi: 10.1080/13546805.2017.13
00091
Pruett, J. R., Kandala, S., Petersen, S. E., and Povinelli, D. J. (2015). Brief report:
theory of mind, relational reasoning, and social responsiveness in children
with and without autism: demonstration of feasibility for a larger-scale study.
J. Autism Dev. Disord. 45, 2243–2251. doi: 10.1007/s10803-015-2357-1
Pyers, J. E., and Senghas, A. (2009). Language promotes false-belief understanding
evidence from learners of a new sign language. Psychol. Sci. 20, 805–812.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02377.x
Raven, J. (2000). The Raven’s progressive matrices: change and stability over culture
and time. Cogn. Psychol. 41, 1–48. doi: 10.1006/cogp.1999.0735
Rice, K., Anderson, L. C., Velnoskey, K., Thompson, J. C., and Redcay, E. (2016).
Biological motion perception links diverse facets of theory of mind during
middle childhood. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 146, 238–246. doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2015.
09.003
Richler, J. J., Cheung, O. S., and Gauthier, I. (2011). Holistic processing predicts
face recognition. Psychol. Sci. 22, 464–471. doi: 10.1177/0956797611401753
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 January 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 25
fnhum-12-00025 January 30, 2018 Time: 16:33 # 11
Meinhardt-Injac et al. Two Systems of Theory of Mind
Richler, J. J., and Gauthier, I. (2014). A meta-analysis and review of holistic face
processing. Psychol. Bull. 140, 1281–1302. doi: 10.1037/a0037004
Sato, W., Uono, S., Kochiyama, T., Yoshimura, S., Sawada, R., Kubota, Y.,
et al. (2017). Structural correlates of reading the mind in the eyes in autism
spectrum disorder. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 11:361. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2017.
00361
Schaafsma, S. M., Pfaff, D. W., Spunt, R. P., and Adolphs, R. (2015). Deconstructing
and reconstructing theory of mind. Trends Cogn. Sci. 19, 65–72. doi: 10.1016/j.
tics.2014.11.007
Schreiber, J. B. (2008). Core reporting practices in structural equation modeling.
Res. Social Adm. Pharm. 4, 83–97. doi: 10.1016/j.sapharm.2007.04.003
Schweinberger, S. R., and Soukup, G. R. (1998). Asymmetric relationships among
perceptions of facial identity, emotion, and facial speech. J. Exp. Psychol. 24,
1748–1765. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.24.6.1748
Shahaeian, A., Peterson, C. C., Slaughter, V., and Wellman, H. M. (2011). Culture
and the sequence of steps in theory of mind development. Dev. Psychol. 47,
1239–1247. doi: 10.1037/a0023899
Slaughter, V., Imuta, K., Peterson, C. C., and Henry, J. D. (2015). Meta-analysis
of theory of mind and peer popularity in the preschool and early school years.
Child Dev. 86, 1159–1174. doi: 10.1111/cdev.12372
Sobel, M. E. (1982). Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in
structural equation models. Sociol. Methodol. 13, 290–313. doi: 10.2307/270723
Stein, T., End, A., and Sterzer, P. (2014). Own-race and own-age biases facilitate
visual awareness of faces under interocular suppression. Front. Hum. Neurosci.
8:582. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00582
Tanaka, J. W., Kaiser, M. D., Butler, S., and Le Grand, R. (2012). Mixed emotions:
holistic and analytic perception of facial expressions. Cogn. Emot. 26, 961–977.
doi: 10.1080/02699931.2011.630933
Vellante, M., Baron-Cohen, S., Melis, M., Marrone, M., Petretto, D. R., Masala, C.,
et al. (2013). The “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test: systematic review of
psychometric properties and a validation study in Italy. Cogn. Neuropsychiatry
18, 326–354. doi: 10.1080/13546805.2012.721728
Vetter, N. C., Altgassen, M., Phillips, L., Mahy, C. E., and Kliegel, M. (2013).
Development of affective theory of mind across adolescence: disentangling
the role of executive functions. Dev. Neuropsychol. 38, 114–125. doi: 10.1080/
87565641.2012.733786
Wilmer, J. B., Germine, L., Chabris, C. F., Chatterjee, G., Williams, M., Loken, E.,
et al. (2010). Human face recognition ability is specific and highly heritable.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107, 5238–5241. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0913053107
Wong, A. C. N., Bukach, C. M., Yuen, C., Yang, L., Leung, S., and Greenspon, E.
(2011). Holistic processing of words modulated by reading experience. PLOS
ONE 6:e20753. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0020753
Wright, S. (1934). The method of path coefficients. Ann. Math. Stat. 5, 161–215.
doi: 10.1214/aoms/1177732676
Zelazo, P. D., Burack, J. A., Benedetto, E., and Frye, D. (1996). Theory of mind
and rule use in individuals with Down’s syndrome: a test of the uniqueness and
specificity claims. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 37, 479–484. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-
7610.1996.tb01429.x
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2018 Meinhardt-Injac, Daum, Meinhardt and Persike. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic
practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply
with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 11 January 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 25
fnhum-12-00025 January 30, 2018 Time: 16:33 # 12
Meinhardt-Injac et al. Two Systems of Theory of Mind
APPENDIX
According to the fundamental corollary of path analysis, path coefficients derive from estimated latent factor correlations,
rcj =
∑
i
bcirij (1)
(Wright, 1934), whereby variables c and j are directly linked with an arrow from j to c, and i runs over all exogeneous variables (origins
of arrows). Now, setting z5 = ToM, z1 = HP, z2 = FR, z3 = RE, z4 = LA, and in view of the structural diagram shown in Figure 1,
Eq. (1) generates the following equations for explaining ToM:
r51 = b51r11 + b52r21 + b53r31 + b54r41
r52 = b51r12 + b52r22 + b53r32 + b54r42
r53 = b51r13 + b52r23 + b53r33 + b54r43
r54 = b51r14 + b52r24 + b53r34 + b54r44
(2)
which reads r = Rb, with r the vector of correlations of criterion z5 with the four predictors, b the vector of path coefficients for all
paths to criterion z5 and R the (4 × 4) predictor correlation matrix. The system (2) is solved by finding the inverse of R, which exists
if all predictors are linear independent, i.e., b= R−1r. With our ML estimates for the latent factor correlations (see Table 2) we find
r =

0.56
0.54
0.35
0.57
 R =

1.00 0.59 0.19 0.26
0.59 1.00 0.11 0.16
0.19 0.11 1.00 0.73
0.26 0.16 0.73 1.00
 b =

0.25
0.32
−0.14
0.55

for the path coefficients to ToM. Since FR and RE receive only a single arrow, applying (1) shows that their path coefficients are
b21 = r21 = 0.59 and b34 = r34 = 0.73, respectively.
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